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1. Introduction {#rmv1903-sec-0001}
===============

There are 4 virus families known to cause viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) in humans: *Arenaviridae*, *Bunyaviridae*, *Filoviridae*, and *Flaviviridae*. While all VHFs can involve bleeding, hemorrhage is mostly a less common complication of severe infection. The general clinical picture for severe disease is one of grave multisystem syndrome with damage to the vascular system, and sometimes severe neurological symptoms,[1](#rmv1903-bib-0001){ref-type="ref"} although many infections may also take a milder course. The natural reservoir hosts of these enveloped RNA viruses include a range of mammalian species, particularly rodents and bats. Most VHF viruses are transmitted to humans via direct contact with host body fluids or excreta, sometimes through an intermediate mammalian host. The *Bunyaviridae* and *Flaviviridae* VHF viruses are transmitted by insect vectors (ticks and mosquitoes). The CDC also now list 2 *Paramyxoviridae* (Hendra virus and Nipah virus) as VHF viruses. While they are not associated with hemorrhage many other aspects of the epidemiology and clinical presentation of these zoonotic viral infections show commonalities with the established VHFs.[2](#rmv1903-bib-0002){ref-type="ref"}

Several outbreaks of VHF in humans are recorded each year globally.[3](#rmv1903-bib-0003){ref-type="ref"} With the glaring exception of the recent Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic in West Africa, VHF outbreaks are typically small, limited to less than 100 patients. The median number of patients for the 17 previous EVD outbreaks is 65.[4](#rmv1903-bib-0004){ref-type="ref"} Possibly due to the generally limited size of outbreaks, viruses associated with VHF have not been considered a priority for research funding. Consequently, existing diagnostics and therapeutics are limited, as is our understanding of the epidemiology, transmission, and animal reservoirs for some of these viruses. However, the recent EVD epidemic in West Africa has shown that VHF outbreaks can occur where least expected (eg, West Africa, whereas most previous outbreaks were in Central Africa)[4](#rmv1903-bib-0004){ref-type="ref"}, [5](#rmv1903-bib-0005){ref-type="ref"} and can rapidly spread out of control. As of February 28, 2016, the recent West African EVD outbreak had infected nearly 29 000 people, with more than 11 000 deaths.[6](#rmv1903-bib-0006){ref-type="ref"} Fragile and under‐resourced health systems in these countries were sluggish in identifying the disease and were unable to respond rapidly and comprehensively enough to stop the spread of the disease.[7](#rmv1903-bib-0007){ref-type="ref"} The situation was further compounded by an initially slow and uncoordinated international response that has been widely condemned.[8](#rmv1903-bib-0008){ref-type="ref"}, [9](#rmv1903-bib-0009){ref-type="ref"}, [10](#rmv1903-bib-0010){ref-type="ref"}, [11](#rmv1903-bib-0011){ref-type="ref"} The unprecedented magnitude of the West African EVD outbreak, along with the significant number of EVD survivors with persistent detectable virus in various body fluids (semen and ocular fluid) after recovering from the disease[12](#rmv1903-bib-0012){ref-type="ref"}, [13](#rmv1903-bib-0013){ref-type="ref"} and/or complications[14](#rmv1903-bib-0014){ref-type="ref"} plus the discovery that large numbers of people with no history of VHF are seropositive for Ebola virus,[15](#rmv1903-bib-0015){ref-type="ref"}, [16](#rmv1903-bib-0016){ref-type="ref"} has challenged our previous notions of the acute nature of these viral infections of humans and called to question our previous low‐priority categorization of these infections with respect to research and health program funding. A retrospective study from Sierra Leone documented serological evidence for infection with a range of VHF viruses (including Ebola and Marburg) in 2% to 8% of patients using acute phase sera from Lassa virus negative febrile patients (collected October 2006‐2008), suggesting that there could be Ebola and Marburg infections that are not characterized by rampant human‐to‐human transmission,[17](#rmv1903-bib-0017){ref-type="ref"} similar to the established endemic nature of viruses like Dengue virus, Lassa virus, Hantavirus,[18](#rmv1903-bib-0018){ref-type="ref"} and Rift Valley fever virus.[19](#rmv1903-bib-0019){ref-type="ref"}, [20](#rmv1903-bib-0020){ref-type="ref"} As of 2016 the EVD epidemic is no longer out of control, but flare‐ups continue: on March 17 Sierra Leone declared an end to a flare‐up that started in January, yet on the very same day, a new patient was confirmed in Guinea leading to 5 deaths as of March 24, 2016, prompting Liberia to close their shared border. This experience emphasizes the need to develop regional and national research networks to better understand the underlying causes of these outbreaks.

Lujo virus (LUJV) was discovered after an outbreak of VHF in Lusaka (Zambia) and Johannesburg (South Africa) in 2008 (Figure [1](#rmv1903-fig-0001){ref-type="fig"}) and was the first novel VHF‐causing virus to be identified in Africa since the discovery of Ebola virus in 1976.[21](#rmv1903-bib-0021){ref-type="ref"}, [22](#rmv1903-bib-0022){ref-type="ref"} Although the LUJV outbreak was limited to just 5 people, mortality was high (80%), with the low threshold of suspicion of VHF among health care workers resulting in diagnostic delay and nosocomial transmission. Here, we review the Lujo VHF outbreak of 2008 in light of the lessons learnt from the recent EVD epidemic in West Africa and the current Zika virus (ZIKV) disease epidemic in the Americas and discuss the possible measures that could be taken by health authorities in Zambia and regionally, to efficiently integrate timely diagnosis of rare zoonotic diseases into existing health care, laboratory infrastructure, and human resource capacity development programmes.

![Map illustrating cross border transmission of Lujo virus (LUJV) in 2008, the results of small mammal Arenavirus surveillance in 2010/2011, and Flavivirus seroprevalence studies undertaken in Zambia in 2015. NC denotes that species are not collected or screened. DENV, Dengue virus; PCR, polymerase chain reaction; WNV, West Nile virus; YFV, Yellow fever virus; ZIKV, Zika virus](RMV-26-446-g001){#rmv1903-fig-0001}

2. The Lujo Viral Hemorrhagic Fever Outbreak of 2008 {#rmv1903-sec-0002}
====================================================

In Zambia and South Africa in 2008, a novel arenavirus (LUJV) infected 5 people, killing the index case and 3 health care workers. The index case was a white female aged 36 years who lived on a peri‐urban farm close to Zambia\'s capital, Lusaka. On September 2, she experienced a sudden onset of severe headache, myalgia, fever, and sore throat and self‐medicated with antipyretics and analgesics.[23](#rmv1903-bib-0023){ref-type="ref"}, [24](#rmv1903-bib-0024){ref-type="ref"} On September 4 she travelled by air to South Africa to attend a wedding on September 6, returning to Zambia on September 7 (day 5 of her illness), when she reported diarrhea and vomiting[24](#rmv1903-bib-0024){ref-type="ref"} (reports diarrhea and vomiting on day 2). Her condition continued to worsen such that on day 7 of her illness she visited a private clinic in Lusaka complaining of severe chest pains, fever, rash, and sore throat for which she was given an assortment of medications (including antiemetic, antipyretic, analgesic, and broad spectrum antibiotics). The next 2 days, her condition rapidly degenerated as she experienced severe myalgias, facial swelling with central nervous system symptoms such as confusion and seizures. She was hospitalized on day 9 and evacuated the following day by air ambulance to a private hospital in Johannesburg, South Africa. On physical examination, the patient exhibited edema of the face and neck, rash, and acute respiratory distress syndrome, but no hemorrhage was observed. Clinical laboratory tests showed that she had elevated liver transaminases, thrombocytopenia, and granulocytosis. The observation of a possible tick bite lead to a tentative diagnosis of Rickettsiosis, and the patient received intravenous cefepime, clarithromycin, and linezolid, along with lactated Ringer\'s solution and dobutamine.[24](#rmv1903-bib-0024){ref-type="ref"} Although intensive care treatment was instituted, together with hemodialysis and inotropic and vasopressor therapy, the patient\'s condition degenerated rapidly with hemodynamic collapse and death on day 13 of her illness. No postmortem was conducted.

Patients 2 to 5 are described in detail elsewhere[24](#rmv1903-bib-0024){ref-type="ref"} and included 1 paramedic (patient 2) involved in the initial evacuation of the index case. Patient 2 was diagnosed with suspected thrombotic thrombocytopenic purpura, which was then changed to suspected viral haemorrhagic fever a day later, after the epidemiological link with patient 1 was made.[24](#rmv1903-bib-0024){ref-type="ref"} Patient 3 was an intensive‐care‐unit nurse that cared for the index case, and patient 4 was a cleaner who disinfected the room after the death of the index case. Patients 2 to 4 fell ill 9 to 13 days after probable exposure/contact with the index case, and all resulted in death. All 3 nosocomially transmitted patients were unwell for 10 to 13 days in the community before they were admitted and an epidemiological link with the index case established as well as VHF infection control measures implemented. Patient 3 was initiated on ribavirin on or around the same day that VHF was suspected in patient 2 (September 29 or 30, 2008). Patient 4 fell ill and sought care at her local clinic on September 27, but when seen as an outpatient at her local hospital 6 days later (3 days after the VHF alert and contact tracing commenced), she was initiated on therapy for tuberculosis (TB). She was admitted 2 days later, at which point the contact tracing team made contact with her, and she was referred to the teaching hospital for treatment.

Patient 5 was a 47‐year‐old white female who also worked in the intensive care unit and had contact with patient 2 (but not with the index case), just 2 days before the VHF alert was raised. There were noted lapses in personal protection, but fortunately by the time she fell ill she was known to the contact tracing team, and ribavirin was administered on day 2 of her illness based on suspected VHF. After being given ribavirin, patient 5 became seriously ill needing mechanical ventilation, but gradually recovered and was discharged after 42 days in hospital. She suffered prolonged neurological sequelae for up to 6 months after discharge from hospital.[24](#rmv1903-bib-0024){ref-type="ref"}

The clinical presentation and course of Lujo VHF was quite consistent across all 4 fatal patients, starting with myalgia, headache, and fever, followed by onset of rash and pharyngitis on days 4 and 5. Vomiting and diarrhea were present from days 3 to 7, and then the condition deteriorated with thrombocytopenia and elevated transaminases, severe neurological symptoms, hemodynamic collapse, and death.[24](#rmv1903-bib-0024){ref-type="ref"} Patient 5 received many of the same treatments as patients 1 to 4, with the key differences that might have contributed to her survival being prompt initiation of treatment with ribavirin, recombinant factor VIIa, *N*‐acetylcysteine, and atorvastatin.[24](#rmv1903-bib-0024){ref-type="ref"}

3. Old World and New World Arenaviruses {#rmv1903-sec-0003}
=======================================

The family *Arenaviridae* consists of 2 genera, *Mammarenavirus* and *Reptarenavirus*, which infect mammals and reptiles, respectively.[25](#rmv1903-bib-0025){ref-type="ref"} Arenavirus particles are enveloped and spherical in shape and possess a bisegmented single‐stranded ambisense RNA genome comprising a large (L) and small (S) RNA segment, each contained within its own helical nucleocapsid.[26](#rmv1903-bib-0026){ref-type="ref"} The L segment encodes a viral RNA‐dependent RNA polymerase and a smaller protein termed Z‐protein. The S segment encodes a viral nucleoprotein and viral glycoprotein precursor (Figure [2](#rmv1903-fig-0002){ref-type="fig"}). Based on antigenic properties, geographical distribution, and phylogenetic analysis; mammalian arenaviruses are divided into 2 distinct groups: New World (NW) arenaviruses (Tacaribe serocomplex) and Old World (OW) arenaviruses (Lassa‐lymphocytic choriomeningitis serocomplex)[25](#rmv1903-bib-0025){ref-type="ref"} (Figure [2](#rmv1903-fig-0002){ref-type="fig"}). The NW arenaviruses that are known to infect humans include Junín virus, Guanarito virus, Machupo virus, Sabìa virus, and Chapare virus. Although LUJV is only the third OW arenavirus that is known to be pathogenic in humans, along with Lassa fever virus and lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (Table [1](#rmv1903-tbl-0001){ref-type="table"}), studies utilizing modern molecular tools including next generation sequencing technology are rapidly identifying new arenaviruses in rodent hosts.[27](#rmv1903-bib-0027){ref-type="ref"} Epidemiologically, the assumption is that these viruses are generally well adapted to their rodent hosts, and those that might be pathogenic in humans cause only mild febrile illness, otherwise more arenaviruses would have been previously discovered. NW arenaviruses appear to be more commonly associated with human disease, possibly influenced by the use of different receptors[28](#rmv1903-bib-0028){ref-type="ref"}: OW arenaviruses such as Lassa fever virus use α‐dystroglycan (αDG) as a cellular receptor, which may be highly prevalent in the membranes of monocytes and dendritic cells,[29](#rmv1903-bib-0029){ref-type="ref"} but the natural ligand of αDG, laminin, does not prevent virus infection *in vitro* and other candidate receptors (Axl, Tyro3, LSECtin and DC‐SIGN), including some shared with Ebola, have been shown *in vitro* to facilitate cell entry.[30](#rmv1903-bib-0030){ref-type="ref"} The primary receptor for NW arenaviruses is transferin receptor 1 (TfR1), which is widely distributed and would facilitate a broad cell tropism,[31](#rmv1903-bib-0031){ref-type="ref"} and there is *in vitro* evidence that even a single mutation can confer tropism to human cells.[32](#rmv1903-bib-0032){ref-type="ref"}

![Phylogentic trees of all 4 arenavirus‐encoded proteins for representative Old World viruses, along with Junín virus (JUNV) and Tacaribe virus (TCRV). Phylogenetic trees of amino acid sequences are generated on Clustal Omega using default parameters. NCBI accession numbers and sequence files used are available on request from corresponding author. Scale is equal to substitutions per site. Lassa (strain Josiah), Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (LCMV) (strain Armstrong). GAIV, Gairo virus; IPPYV, Ippy virus; LASV, Lassa fever virus; LNKV, Lusaka New‐Kasama virus; LUAV, Lusaka‐Namwala virus; LUJV, Lujo virus; MOBV, Mobala virus; MOPV, Mopeia virus; MORV, Morogoro virus; MWV, Merino walk virus; RDRP, RNA‐dependent RNA polymerase; WENV, Wenzhou virus](RMV-26-446-g002){#rmv1903-fig-0002}

###### 

Summary of mammalian arenaviruses and their associated epidemiological features[a](#rmv1903-note-0001){ref-type="fn"}

  **Virus, Abbreviation and Isolation/Detection Date**   **Isolated**   **Lineage/Clade**   **Natural Host**                                                                                                                                                                             **Geographic Distribution**                             **Disease in Humans**
  ------------------------------------------------------ -------------- ------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  **Old World Arenaviruses**                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
  Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus, LCMV, 1933         Yes            LCM                 *Mus musculus Linnaeus* (house mouse) *Apodemus sylvaticus Linnaeus* (long‐tailed field mice)                                                                                                Americas, Europe                                        Undifferentiated febrile illness, aseptic meningitis; rarely serious. Laboratory infections common, usually mild but 5 fatal cases.
  Lassa virus, LASV, 1969                                Yes            Lassa               *Mastomys sp.* (Multimammate rat)                                                                                                                                                            West Africa, imported cases in Europe, Japan, USA       Lassa fever; mild to severe and fatal disease. Laboratory infection common and often severe.
  Mopeia virus, MOPV, 1977                               Yes            Mopeia              *Mastomys natalensis* (Multimammate rat)                                                                                                                                                     Mozambique, Zimbabwe                                    Unknown
  Mobala virus, MOBV, 1983                               Yes            Mobala              *Praomys sp.* (soft‐furred mouse)                                                                                                                                                            Central African Republic                                Unknown
  Ippy virus, IPPYV, 1984                                Yes            Lassa               *Arvicanthis sp.* (unstriped grass rats) *Praomys sp.* (soft‐furred mouse)                                                                                                                   Central African Republic                                Unknown
  Merino Walk, MWV, 1985                                 Yes            Merino              *Myotomys unisulcatus sp.* (Busk Karoo rat)                                                                                                                                                  South Africa                                            Unknown
  Menekre, 2005                                          No             Mopeia              *Hylomyscus sp.* (African wood mouse)                                                                                                                                                        Ivory Coast                                             Unknown
  Gbagroube, 2005                                        No             Lassa               *Mus* (*Nannomys*) *setulosus* (African pigmy mouse)                                                                                                                                         Ivory Coast                                             Unknown
  Morogoro, 2007                                         No             Mopeia              *Mastomys natalensis* (Multimammate rat)                                                                                                                                                     Tanzania                                                Unknown
  Kodoko, 2007                                           Yes            LCM                 *Mus* (*Nannomys*) *minutoides* (savannah pygmy mouse)                                                                                                                                       Guinea                                                  Unknown
  Lujo virus, LUJV, 2008                                 Yes            Lujo                Unknown                                                                                                                                                                                      Zambia, South Africa                                    Fatal hemorrhagic fever
  Lemniscomys, 2008                                      No             Lassa               *Lemniscomys rosalia* (Single‐striped grass mouse) Mastomys natalensis (Multimammate rat)                                                                                                    Tanzania                                                Unknown
  Lunk virus, LNKV, 2008                                 No             LCM                 Mus minutoides (savannah pygmy mouse)                                                                                                                                                        Tanzania                                                Unknown
  Luna virus, LUAV, 2009                                 Yes            Lusaka‐Namwala      Mastomys natalensis (Multimammate rat)                                                                                                                                                       Zambia                                                  Unknown
  Whenzou, 2014                                          No                                 *Rattus norvegicus* (Brown rat)                                                                                                                                                              China                                                   Unknown
  Gairo, 2015                                            No             Mobala              *Mastomys natalensis* (Multimammate rat)                                                                                                                                                     Tanzania                                                Unknown
  **New World Arenaviruses**                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
  Tacaribe, 1956                                         Yes            B                   Originally isolated from *Artibeus sp.* (bats) but later *in vivo* experiments on *Artibeus jamaciensis* suggested they are not the reservoir hosts[54](#rmv1903-bib-0054){ref-type="ref"}   Trinidad, West Indies                                   Unknown. One suspected laboratory case that was moderately symptomtic.
  Junín, 1958                                            Yes            B                   *Calomys musculinus* (drylands vesper mouse)                                                                                                                                                 Argentina                                               Argentinian hemorrhagic fever. Laboratory infection common often severe.
  Machupo, 1963                                          Yes            B                   *Calomys callosus* (large vesper mouse)                                                                                                                                                      Bolivia                                                 Bolivian hemorrhagic fever. Laboratory infection common often severe.
  Cupixi, 1965                                           Yes            B                   *Oryzomys gaeldi* (rice rat)                                                                                                                                                                 Brazil                                                  Unknown
  Amapari,1965                                           Yes            B                   *Neacomys guianae* (Guiana Bristly mouse)                                                                                                                                                    Brazil                                                  Unknown
  Parana, 1970                                           Yes            A                   *Oryzomys buccinatus* (Paraguayan Rice Rat)                                                                                                                                                  Paraguay                                                Unknown
  Tamiami, 1970                                          Yes            A                   *Sigmodon hispidus* (hispid cotton rat)                                                                                                                                                      Florida, USA                                            Antibodies detected
  Pichinde, 1971                                         Yes            A                   Oryzomys albigularis (Tomes\'s Rice rat)                                                                                                                                                     Colombia                                                Occasional mild laboratory infection.
  Latino, 1973                                           Yes            C                   *Calomys callosus* (large vesper mouse)                                                                                                                                                      Bolivia                                                 Unknown
  Flexal, 1977                                           Yes            A                   Oryzomys spp. (Rice rats)                                                                                                                                                                    Brazil                                                  One severe laboratory infection recorded
  Guanarito, 1989                                        Yes            B                   *Zygodontomys brevicauda* (Short‐tailed Cane mouse)                                                                                                                                          Venezuela                                               Venezuelan hemorrhagic fever
  Sabia, 1993                                            Yes            B                   Unknown                                                                                                                                                                                      Brazil                                                  Viral hemorrhagic fever, 2 severe laboratory infections recorded.
  Oliveros, 1996                                         Yes            C                   *Bolomys obscuris* (Dark bolo mouse)                                                                                                                                                         Argentina                                               Unknown
  Whitewater Arroyo, 1997                                Yes            D                   *Neotoma spp.* (Wood rats)                                                                                                                                                                   USA: New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, California, Colorado   Unknown
  Pirital, 1997                                          Yes            A                   *Sigmodon alstoni* (Alston\'s Cotton Rat)                                                                                                                                                    Venezuela                                               Unknown
  Pampa, 1997                                            Yes                                *Bolomys sp.*                                                                                                                                                                                Argentina                                               Unknown
  Bear Canyon, 1998                                      Yes            D                   *Peromyscus californicus* (California mouse), *Neotoma macrotis* (large‐eared woodrat)                                                                                                       USA: California                                         Unknown
  Ocozocoautla de Espinosa, 2000                         No             B                   *Peromyscus mexicanus* (Mexican deer mouse)                                                                                                                                                  Mexico                                                  Unknown
  Allpahuayo, 2001                                       Yes            A                   *Oecomys bicolor,* (Bicolored Arboreal Rice Rat) Aecomys paricola                                                                                                                            Peru                                                    Unknown
  Tonto Creek, 2001                                      Yes            D                   *Neotoma albigula* (white‐throated woodrat)                                                                                                                                                  USA: Arizona                                            Unknown
  Big Brushy Tank, 2002                                  Yes            D                   *Neotoma albigula* (white‐throated woodrat)                                                                                                                                                  USA: Arizona                                            Unknown
  Real de Catorce, 2005                                  No             D                   *Neotoma leucodon* (White‐toothed Woodrat)                                                                                                                                                   Mexico                                                  Unknown
  Catarina, 2007                                         Yes            D                   *Neotoma micropus* (Southern Plains Woodrat)                                                                                                                                                 USA: Texas                                              Unknown
  Skinner Tank, 2008                                     Yes            D                   *Neotoma mexicana* (Mexican woodrat)                                                                                                                                                         USA: Arizona                                            Unknown
  Chapare, 2008                                          Yes            B                   Unknown                                                                                                                                                                                      Bolivia                                                 Single fatal hemorrhagic fever case
  Middle Pease River, 2013                               No             D                   *Neotoma micropus* **(**southern plains woodrats)                                                                                                                                            USA: Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico                        Unknown
  Patawa, 2015                                           Yes            A                   Oecomys spp. (Arboreal Rice Rat)                                                                                                                                                             French Guiana                                           Unknown
  Pinhal, 2015                                           No             ?                   Calomys tener (Delicate vesper mouse)                                                                                                                                                        Brazil                                                  Unknown

Adapted from (26, CDC website).

4. Searching for the Lujo Virus Reservoir Host {#rmv1903-sec-0004}
==============================================

There have been 2 studies aimed at finding the natural animal host of LUJV and to more broadly investigate the prevalence and molecular epidemiology of arenaviruses in rodents and small mammals in Zambia.[33](#rmv1903-bib-0033){ref-type="ref"}, [34](#rmv1903-bib-0034){ref-type="ref"} Combining data from both studies, arenaviruses were identified in kidney tissues by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) in about 6% (23/408) of captured Natal multimammate rodents (*Mastomys natalensis*) and 33% (1/3) of African Pygmy Mice (*Mus minutoides*). Among 114 other animals tested (mainly Muridae species) no arenaviruses were detected (Figure [1](#rmv1903-fig-0001){ref-type="fig"}). Ninety six per cent (23/24) of arenavirus positive rodents were captured in peri‐urban environments close to large human populations (Figure [1](#rmv1903-fig-0001){ref-type="fig"}). Although the studies did not detect LUJV, 2 other novel arenaviruses were identified: Lusaka‐Namwala Virus,[33](#rmv1903-bib-0033){ref-type="ref"} a Lassa fever‐like virus; and Lusaka New‐Kasama virus,[34](#rmv1903-bib-0034){ref-type="ref"} a novel lymphycytic choriomeningitis‐related virus. The capacity of these novel viruses to infect humans is unknown.

5. Phylogenetic Analysis of Lujo virus {#rmv1903-sec-0005}
======================================

For other segmented RNA viruses, most notably influenza virus and SARS‐CoV (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus), reassortment and/or recombination are central to their importance as human pathogens, giving rise to the sudden emergence of novel species of global pandemic potential. There has hence been great concern that arenaviruses, with their established capacity to cause severe disease in humans, and their segmented RNA genomes could also give rise to novel species with pandemic potential. Recombinant mammarenaviruses have been produced in the laboratory for vaccine development purposes,[36](#rmv1903-bib-0036){ref-type="ref"}, [37](#rmv1903-bib-0037){ref-type="ref"} and reptarenaviruses are highly recombinant (due to the pet trade and the housing of diverse snake species in close proximity),[38](#rmv1903-bib-0038){ref-type="ref"} but for wild‐type mammarenaviruses with their segmented genomes and overlapping host species, the evidence for reassorted or recombinant species of either NW or OW mammarenaviruses is weak.[39](#rmv1903-bib-0039){ref-type="ref"}, [40](#rmv1903-bib-0040){ref-type="ref"} The variable position of some OW arenaviruses on different branches, depending on which viral protein is analyzed, is suggestive of possible historical recombination events, but the branch lengths (Figure [2](#rmv1903-fig-0002){ref-type="fig"}) and sequence identities (Table [2](#rmv1903-tbl-0002){ref-type="table"}) suggest these events have been followed by significant divergence. When analyzing only a tiny fraction of the total number of quasi species in existence, more conserved regions might masquerade as evidence of recombination using some analysis tools.[39](#rmv1903-bib-0039){ref-type="ref"} As indicated in Table [2](#rmv1903-tbl-0002){ref-type="table"}, the viral nucleoprotein appears to be more conserved than the other 3 viral proteins.

###### 

Identity matrix showing amino acid percentage identity, for all 4 viral proteins, between LUJV and representative OW and NW arenaviruses

                       **Arenavirus Protein**             
  -------------------- ------------------------ ---- ---- ----
  **OW Arenviruses**                                      
  WENV                 45                       43   60   44
  IPPYV                46                       42   57   42
  GAIV                 45                       44   59   42
  MWV                  43                       43   57   42
  LASV                 43                       49   59   42
  MOBV                 44                       46   59   43
  LUAV                 44                       47   60   43
  MOPV                 45                       51   57   43
  MORV                 45                       44   57   43
  LNKV                 43                       44   61   44
  LCMV                 43                       46   60   44
  **NW Arenavruses**                                      
  TCRV                 36                       29   48   39
  JUNV                 37                       30   48   40

Abbreviations: GAIV, Gairo virus; JUNV, Junín virus; LASV, Lassa fever virus; LCMV, Lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus; LNKV, Lusaka New‐Kasama virus; LUAV, Lusaka‐Namwala virus; MOBV, Mobala virus; MOPV, Mopeia virus; MORV, Morogoro virus; MWV, Merino walk virus; NW, New World; OW, Old World; TCRV, Tacaribe virus; WENV, Wenzhou virus.

Phylogenetically LUJV is interesting, because amino acid identities show it is clearly among the OW arenaviruses, phylogenetic trees of amino acid sequences for all 4 viral proteins, consistently suggest that LUJV is the closest OW relative of the NW arenaviruses (Figure [2](#rmv1903-fig-0002){ref-type="fig"}). All 4 viral proteins are similarly positioned for LUJV with respect to their closest relatives (Lusaka New‐Kasama virus and lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus) (Figure [2](#rmv1903-fig-0002){ref-type="fig"}) which makes a recent recombinational origin highly unlikely, suggesting LUJV is an established virus in nature but that we simply have not yet identified its reservoir host.

6. Epidemiology of Lujo virus {#rmv1903-sec-0006}
=============================

The index case had regular contact with animals because she kept dogs, cats, and horses at her premises, and the outbreak response team found evidence of rodents, the natural host of all known arenaviruses,[23](#rmv1903-bib-0023){ref-type="ref"} around the stables. Patient 1 reportedly cut her shin on a broken bottle on August 30, 3 days before she became ill,[23](#rmv1903-bib-0023){ref-type="ref"} and it is plausible that the wound came into contact with rodent feces/urine, but in Lusaka, whether on peri‐urban farms or in crowded townships, people are in close contact with rodents, and if the natural host is a common rodent species, it begs the question of why LUJV infections are not more common in humans? Taken together with previous surveillance studies that did not detect LUJV in 420 wild‐captured rodents,[33](#rmv1903-bib-0033){ref-type="ref"}, [34](#rmv1903-bib-0034){ref-type="ref"} it seems plausible to speculate that a rare and unlikely transmission event led to the infection of a human by LUJV. The environment around the farm would support other small mammal species (rabbits, genets, civets, etc.), but as arenaviruses seem to have coevolved with their rodent hosts, the phylogenetic evidence suggests that the natural host of LUJV should also be a rodent.[35](#rmv1903-bib-0035){ref-type="ref"}

It might be a rare species, or one that is rarely in contact with human settlement, and/or transmission to humans might require a vector such as a tick, which might explain the possible requirement for the presence of other domestic animals such as horses. While the main route of arenavirus transmission is through contact with urine or feces, the Tacaribe virus was purportedly isolated from mosquitoes as well as bats and has recently been detected in ticks.[41](#rmv1903-bib-0041){ref-type="ref"} The physicians who attended the index case of Lujo VHF in South Africa recorded what they thought could be a potential tick bite on the patient\'s foot.[24](#rmv1903-bib-0024){ref-type="ref"} Although this may be coincidental, future surveillance of ticks and mosquitoes for novel RNA viruses is possibly warranted, particularly in light of the recent ZIKV disease outbreak in the Americas[42](#rmv1903-bib-0042){ref-type="ref"} and a recent next generation sequencing study of mosquitoes in China identified multiple novel flaviviruses.[43](#rmv1903-bib-0043){ref-type="ref"}

7. What Limited the Lujo Viral Hemorrhagic Fever Outbreak? {#rmv1903-sec-0007}
==========================================================

There are several features of the LUJV outbreak that may have contributed to the limited spread of the virus: the index case was relatively wealthy, living on a peri‐urban farm, and seeking care in a small private hospital. For this reason she had minimal contact with other people while she was ill. Also, human‐to‐human transmission of LUJV appears to occur in the late stages of the infection, maybe during the last 3 days before death,[24](#rmv1903-bib-0024){ref-type="ref"} a likely smaller window of transmission compared with EVD.[44](#rmv1903-bib-0044){ref-type="ref"} While the 2008 outbreak did not spread to urban populations, in a possible future scenario, an infected individual could travel to crowded urban centers, dramatically increasing the risk of uncontainable spread. At the private hospital involved in the LUJV outbreak, the level of awareness for possible VHF was low,[24](#rmv1903-bib-0024){ref-type="ref"} and without intervention this is likely also to be the case at over‐crowded government clinics that serve poor communities in Lusaka. Health‐seeking behavior may involve visiting traditional healers that would also delay diagnosis, as documented in West Africa during the recent EVD epidemic.[45](#rmv1903-bib-0045){ref-type="ref"} Zambia\'s high burden of human immunodeficiency virus/TB, malnutrition, and other diseases of poverty could also impact on the size and impact of a future outbreak. Taking all these factors into consideration, it would be dangerously complacent to think that the magnitude and spread of a potential future LUJV outbreak will be similar to that of 2008.

8. Lujo virus Diagnostic Preparedness {#rmv1903-sec-0008}
=====================================

The unpredictable nature of VHF outbreaks presents a challenge to poorly resourced health systems across Africa, as to what level of resources we should commit to rare but potentially high‐impact outbreaks. The LUJV outbreak originated in Zambia, a country with no prior recorded VHF outbreak, although there is recent evidence from a flavivirus seroprevalence study undertaken in western and north‐western provinces of low‐level exposure to Yellow fever virus (plaque reduction neutralization titre ≥1:10 0.5% \[66.6% IgG + ve. 33.3% IgM + ve\]), Dengue virus (4.1% IgG + ve), West Nile virus (10% IgG + ve), and ZIKV (6% IgG + ve).[46](#rmv1903-bib-0046){ref-type="ref"} A filovirus modeling study based on reservoir host distribution suggests Zambia is very low risk for Ebola, but conversely, is at the center of a putative "Marburg belt," although there have been no recorded cases of Marburg VHF in Zambia.[47](#rmv1903-bib-0047){ref-type="ref"} With ever increasing international travel within Africa, and globally, all countries are potentially at risk from human importation of VHF and should have in place some kind of diagnostic capacity, at the very minimum, to provide some kind of diagnostic service until regional/international assistance is mobilized.

For VHF outbreaks in Africa the process of pathogen identification has historically been outsourced to United States and European biosafety level 4 (BSL‐4) laboratories, but the development of rapid molecular diagnostic tests for known VHF pathogens, and the increasing availability of molecular diagnostic platforms on the continent, supported by human immunodeficiency virus and TB diagnostic capacity development initiatives, makes a national or regional primary diagnostic response highly feasible.[48](#rmv1903-bib-0048){ref-type="ref"} WHO collaborating centers for VHF diagnosis now include 5 African research institutes, in South Africa, Gabon, Kenya, Uganda, and Senegal, but in late 2013, after the first reports of mysterious and sudden deaths in Guinea in December, it took 4 months before Ebola virus was identified on March 22, 2014, in European BSL‐4 laboratories.[10](#rmv1903-bib-0010){ref-type="ref"} The subsequent international response has been widely criticized as being unacceptably slow,[10](#rmv1903-bib-0010){ref-type="ref"} with this initial 4‐month window between infection of the index case and identification of the causal agent a key failure that allowed the virus to take hold and spread regionally. A range of factors, both human (population demographics, health seeking behavior, burial practices, government response, etc.) and viral (pathogenicity and transmissibility of the specific virus strain) have probable impact on eventual outbreak size and impact, but molecular confirmation of the presence of a hemorrhagic fever virus is now the seminal event that gives local and international health officials the confirmation they need to mobilize a comprehensive infection control response. Having functional molecular diagnostic capacity nationally or regionally is key to the control of future VHF outbreaks.

The first consideration for laboratory diagnosis of highly pathogenic viruses is biological safety. History has shown that laboratories are high‐risk environments,[49](#rmv1903-bib-0049){ref-type="ref"} and there needs to be a comprehensive plan and standard operation procedures in place, to ensure worker safety and outbreak prevention. VHF viruses are BSL‐4 pathogens, but due to the cost of construction and maintenance, these facilities are available at just a few centers and are primarily required for infecting cell culture or culturing dangerous pathogens. For diagnosis in the field or at a national reference laboratory, the West African EVD outbreak has led to well‐established protocols for "relatively" safe collection of specimens and specimen handling for molecular diagnosis,[50](#rmv1903-bib-0050){ref-type="ref"} with emphasis and training on appropriate personal protective equipment and specimen handling techniques. Importantly, these safety measures need to be applied to specimens collected from any contacts of the index case, before the specific etiological agent is confirmed. For known VHF pathogens there are more molecular diagnostic assays becoming available.[48](#rmv1903-bib-0048){ref-type="ref"} WHO recently approved 6 new rapid diagnostic tests for EVD; 3 real‐time PCR tests, 2 immunochromatographic tests, and 1 multiplex PCR test.[51](#rmv1903-bib-0051){ref-type="ref"} A modest stock of such diagnostics, including positive and negative controls, reordered on expiry, would cost little and could be embedded into ongoing training and skills development activities. In contrast to the traditional technology of cell culture, molecular techniques do not run the risk of amplifying infectious material.

In Zambia, the University of Zambia School of Veterinary Medicine BSL‐3 laboratory has been nominated by the Zambian Ministry of Health as the national outbreak response diagnostic facility. Diagnosis of suspected patients of VHF is currently performed using conventional real‐time PCR with sets of primers for the detection of Ebola, Marburg, Lujo, and Lassa fever viruses.[52](#rmv1903-bib-0052){ref-type="ref"} Sanger sequencing facilities are also available but are of limited use for detecting unknown/novel VHF viruses (species or strains) that are not detected by the available assays. Plans are being drawn up to invest in next generation sequencing technology, through the new Illumina MiniSeq and/or Oxford Nanopore minION sequencer, the latter of which has already been used in the field to study the molecular epidemiology of Ebola.[53](#rmv1903-bib-0053){ref-type="ref"} In the absence of suspected VHF patients, these technologies will be actively used for research projects on other infectious disease priorities, building the human resource capacity to offer rapid pathogen identification services in the event of future VHF or respiratory virus outbreaks.

9. Conclusions {#rmv1903-sec-0009}
==============

Lujo virus causes severe hemorrhagic fever with highly permissive human‐to‐human transmission and high case fatality. The animal reservoir and mode of transmission to humans are unknown, and the virus is phylogenetically equidistant from other major OW arenaviruses. The limited nature of the LUJV outbreak in 2008 was fortuitous, but the identity, location, and scale of possible future arenavirus or other VHF outbreaks cannot be predicted. For this reason the development of diagnostic capacity across the region is essential to facilitate a rapid and effective response. For known VHF pathogens, national governments should ensure that appropriate and effective means for diagnostic response is embedded within their leading research institutions. For identifying novel VHF pathogens, the required technology is becoming increasingly more available and affordable and could be used for a range of research activities, training, and building up the skills and experience of personnel to respond effectively to novel infectious disease diagnostic challenges.

Abbreviations {#rmv1903-sec-0010}
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